NVIDIA · johntmyers · Aug 12, 2026 · Aug 12, 2026 · Aug 13, 2026 · Aug 13, 2026
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ Common findings:
   callbacks. On an older release, set `bind_address = "127.0.0.1:17670"` or
   upgrade.
 - Supervisor image exits before printing `openshell-sandbox --version`: the image should be the scratch supervisor image from `deploy/docker/Dockerfile.supervisor` and must contain a static executable at `/openshell-sandbox`.
+- A sandbox with explicit `protocol: tcp` endpoints fails before workload readiness: confirm the Docker or Podman driver supplied the `policy-dns-transparent-tcp` runtime capability and inspect supervisor logs for missing `nft`, synthetic-route overlap, or namespace-local DNS/TCP listener bind failures. Kubernetes, VM, sidecar, and out-of-tree drivers must reject this policy until they provide the complete substrate; use omitted protocol with an explicit proxy on those runtimes.
 - `mise run e2e:docker:gpu` fails with `docker info --format json did not report any discovered NVIDIA CDI GPU devices`: Docker may report `CDISpecDirs` while still having no generated NVIDIA CDI specs. Verify `.DiscoveredDevices` contains entries such as `nvidia.com/gpu=all`, verify `/etc/cdi` or `/var/run/cdi` contains a generated NVIDIA spec, and check that `nvidia-cdi-refresh.service` and `nvidia-cdi-refresh.path` from NVIDIA Container Toolkit are enabled and healthy. The service is a one-shot unit, so `inactive (dead)` can be normal after a successful run; use `systemctl status` and `journalctl` to distinguish success from a skipped or failed refresh. NVIDIA recommends enabling the path and service units, and restarting `nvidia-cdi-refresh.service` to regenerate missing or stale CDI specs. If specs are generated but Docker still reports no discovered devices, restart Docker or reload the daemon and re-check `docker info`.
 
 For source checkout development, restart the local gateway with:
@@ -210,6 +211,10 @@ Common findings:
 - Sandbox image missing or pull denied: verify image reference and registry credentials.
 - Sandbox fails before readiness with an identity-resolution error: inspect the image's OCI `USER` and matching `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/group` entries, or explicitly set both process identity fields in policy. Numeric workload identities `1` through `4294967294` are accepted; root, the invalid identity sentinel, and missing identities are rejected.
 - Supervisor cannot call back: check callback endpoint and gateway logs.
+- A sandbox with explicit `protocol: tcp` endpoints fails before readiness:
+  inspect supervisor logs for policy DNS port-53 binding, synthetic-route, or
+  nftables redirect failures. Rootless Podman must provide these primitives
+  inside the supervisor-owned nested network namespace; setup fails closed.
 - Gateway exits before becoming healthy with a callback-listener discovery
   error: inspect `podman info --debug`, the configured Podman network, and the
   host's IPv4 default route. Rootless pasta uses the private source address

@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ For this tier, default to:
 - `access: read-only` when the user says "read", "browse", "view", "query", "fetch"
 - `access: read-write` when the user says "read-write", "create", "update" (but not "delete")
 - `access: full` when the user says "full access", "everything", "unrestricted"
-- L4-only (omit `protocol`, or use explicit `protocol: tcp`) when the user says
-  "just allow it", "pass through", "no inspection". Prefer omission unless the
-  user wants the transport intent stated explicitly. Explicit TCP requires a
-  valid DNS hostname; omit `protocol` for a legacy hostless `allowed_ips`
-  proxy endpoint.
+- L4-only when the user says "just allow it", "pass through", or "no
+  inspection". Omit `protocol` for explicit-proxy clients. Use
+  `protocol: tcp` only when the workload must use native DNS and direct socket
+  calls, the endpoint has a valid DNS hostname, and the selected runtime
+  support (currently Docker and Podman).
 
 ### Moderate Tier (host + partial path knowledge)
 
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ Follow this decision tree based on the detail tier and user intent:
 ```
 Is L7 inspection needed?
 ├─ No (user wants pass-through / "just allow it")
-│   └─ Generate L4-only policy (no protocol, or protocol: tcp with a DNS hostname; no tls/rules/access)
+│   ├─ Explicit-proxy client → omit protocol
+│   └─ Native DNS/socket client with a DNS hostname on a supported runtime → protocol: tcp
 │
 └─ Yes (user wants method/path control)
     │
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ Is L7 inspection needed?
 | API host port | TLS setting |
 |--------------|-------------|
 | Port 443 (HTTPS) and L7 rules/preset needed | `tls: terminate` (required for inspection) |
-| Port 443 (HTTPS) and L4-only | Omit `tls` (passthrough, no L7) |
+| Port 443 (HTTPS) and L4-only | Omit `tls` (passthrough, no L7); choose omitted protocol or explicit TCP based on client/runtime as above |
 | Non-443 (HTTP) | Omit `tls` |
 
 **Critical**: `protocol: rest` on port 443 without `tls: terminate` will not work — the proxy cannot inspect encrypted traffic. Always set `tls: terminate` when combining port 443 with L7 rules.
@@ -415,7 +416,7 @@ Evaluate the generated policy for overly broad access and **include warnings in
 
 | Condition | Warning to show |
 |-----------|----------------|
-| **L4-only** (no `protocol`, or `protocol: tcp`) | "This policy allows all HTTP methods and paths without inspection. The proxy will only check host:port and binary identity. Consider adding `protocol: rest` with a preset if you want method-level control." |
+| **L4-only** (no `protocol`, or `protocol: tcp`) | "This policy allows all application methods and paths without inspection. An omitted protocol uses explicit-proxy behavior; `protocol: tcp` enables policy DNS and transparent TCP only on a runtime that advertises the complete substrate (currently Docker and Podman). Consider `protocol: rest` with a preset if you want HTTP method-level control." |
 | **`access: full`** | "This policy allows all HTTP methods (including DELETE) on all paths. If you don't need DELETE, `read-write` is safer. If you only need to read, `read-only` is the most restrictive option." |
 | **`access: full` + `enforcement: audit`** | "Full access in audit mode provides no actual restriction — all traffic flows through. This is effectively a monitoring-only policy." |
 | **`access: read-write`** when user hasn't confirmed write need | "This policy allows POST, PUT, and PATCH on all paths. If you only need to read data, `read-only` is more restrictive." |

@@ -346,6 +346,11 @@ This is the most important multi-step workflow. It enables a tight feedback cycl
 
 **Key concept**: Policies have static fields (immutable after creation: `filesystem_policy`, `landlock`, `process`) and two dynamic fields: `network_policies` and `network_middlewares`. Both dynamic fields can be updated without recreating the sandbox.
 
+An endpoint with omitted `protocol` retains explicit-proxy behavior. Explicit
+`protocol: tcp` requests policy DNS and transparent TCP and currently requires
+the Docker or Podman runtime; unsupported runtimes reject the policy before starting the
+workload rather than activating only part of the network contract.
+
 ```
 Create sandbox with initial policy
         │

@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ delete, reconciliation removes the row; otherwise it can remain `Deleting`.
 
 | Runtime | Best fit | Sandbox boundary | Notes |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| Docker | Local development with Docker available. | Container plus nested sandbox namespace. | Uses host networking so loopback gateway endpoints work from the supervisor. |
-| Podman | Rootless or single-machine deployments. | Container plus nested sandbox namespace. | Uses the Podman REST API and CDI GPU devices when available. Delivers the supervisor via OCI image volume by default; falls back to extracting the binary to a host-side cache and bind-mounting it when `userns` is configured (overlay does not support idmapped mounts). |
+| Docker | Local development with Docker available. | Container plus nested sandbox namespace. | Uses host networking so loopback gateway endpoints work from the supervisor. Advertises the combined-supervisor policy-DNS and transparent-TCP substrate. |
+| Podman | Rootless or single-machine deployments. | Container plus nested sandbox namespace. | Uses the Podman REST API and CDI GPU devices when available. Delivers the supervisor via OCI image volume by default; falls back to extracting the binary to a host-side cache and bind-mounting it when `userns` is configured (overlay does not support idmapped mounts). Advertises the combined-supervisor policy-DNS and transparent-TCP substrate. |
 | Kubernetes | Cluster deployment through Helm. | Pod plus nested sandbox namespace. | Uses Kubernetes API objects, service accounts, secrets, PVC-backed workspace storage, and GPU resources. |
 | VM | Experimental microVM isolation. | Per-sandbox libkrun VM. | Managed endpoint-backed driver. The gateway spawns `openshell-driver-vm`, waits for its Unix socket, and then consumes it through the same remote `compute_driver.proto` path used by unmanaged endpoint drivers. The VM driver boots a cached bootstrap `rootfs.ext4`, prepares requested OCI images inside a bootstrap VM with `umoci`, attaches the prepared image disk read-only, and gives each sandbox a writable `overlay.ext4` for merged-root changes and runtime material. The driver persists each accepted launch request beside the overlay and restarts those VMs on driver startup without recreating the overlay. |
 | Extension | Out-of-tree drivers operated alongside the gateway. | Whatever boundary the driver implements. | Selected by a non-reserved custom `compute_drivers = ["<name>"]` entry with `[openshell.drivers.<name>].socket_path`, or at launch time by pairing `--drivers <name>` with `--compute-driver-socket=<path>`. Reserved built-in names such as `vm`, `docker`, `podman`, and `kubernetes` cannot be used as unmanaged socket endpoints. The gateway connects to a UDS the operator already provisioned, runs `GetCapabilities`, logs the advertised `driver_name`, and dispatches all sandbox lifecycle calls through `compute_driver.proto`. The driver process and socket lifecycle are operator-owned; the gateway does not spawn, supervise, or remove unmanaged extension drivers. The trust boundary is the socket's filesystem permissions: the operator must ensure only the gateway uid can read/write it. |
@@ -160,6 +160,16 @@ operator override because they place gateway-host filesystem state inside the
 sandbox and can negate OpenShell workspace isolation and filesystem-policy
 controls. Driver-owned supervisor, token, and TLS bind mounts stay reserved.
 
+Network features follow the existing driver/substrate split. Compute drivers
+advertise only the runtime mechanics they can guarantee: namespace and
+capability ownership, DNS/TCP capture installation, and coupled
+restart ordering. The shared supervisor remains the sole owner of DNS
+eligibility, synthetic mappings, process authorization, destination filtering,
+pinned dialing, relay behavior, and OCSF decisions. Docker and Podman advertise
+`policy-dns-transparent-tcp`; other runtimes reject explicit TCP policy until
+they implement and validate the same complete contract. The capability marker
+is driver-owned supervisor input and is removed from workload environments.
+
 Kubernetes deployments may set an AppArmor profile on sandbox agent containers
 through the driver configuration. The Helm chart defaults sandbox agents to
 `Unconfined` so runtime/default AppArmor profiles do not block supervisor

@@ -74,19 +74,39 @@ the shared raw byte relay after the existing adapter gates. Forward HTTP retains
 its guarded single-request relay while sharing authorization, request context,
 policy-pinning, and destination boundaries.
 Adapter-specific response and OCSF event shapes remain at the protocol boundary.
-Policy authors may use `protocol: tcp` as an explicit spelling of the existing
-L4 passthrough behavior. Explicit TCP endpoints require a valid DNS hostname;
-hostless `allowed_ips` and literal-IP selectors remain available only to the
-legacy forward-proxy path when `protocol` is omitted. The network supervisor
-contains a dormant policy-DNS boundary for explicit TCP endpoints:
-it snapshots eligible endpoint identities from one policy generation, resolves
-eligible names only through an explicitly supplied trusted resolver, filters
-answers through the shared destination controls, and publishes expiring
-synthetic-address mappings with separate mapping generations. Refreshes retain
-their synthetic identity, and policy reload, expiry, wrong ports, missing
-mappings, or pool exhaustion fail closed. The pinned connector never resolves
-the name again. No DNS listener is exposed to workloads, resolver configuration
-is not injected, and transparent TCP capture is not active in this increment.
+An explicit `protocol: tcp` endpoint with a valid DNS hostname opts into native
+DNS and transparent TCP when the selected runtime advertises that substrate.
+Hostless `allowed_ips` and literal-IP selectors remain available only to the
+legacy explicit-proxy path when `protocol` is omitted. The shared supervisor
+answers only eligible DNS names, returns an epoch-scoped synthetic address, and
+publishes the expiring name, endpoint, ports, policy generation, and validated
+real addresses as one correlation. A connection to that synthetic address is
+captured before the bypass fence, mapped back to its workload process, authorized
+through the same egress pipeline, and dialed only through the pinned addresses.
+Omitted protocol endpoints retain explicit-proxy behavior.
+
+The DNS store is in-memory and sandbox-local. A combined-supervisor restart also
+restarts its workload; before execution, the supervisor advances a persisted
+boot epoch and installs only that epoch's synthetic capture ranges. An address
+cached from the preceding epoch therefore falls through to the bypass fence
+instead of inheriting a new mapping. Policy reload, expiry, wrong ports, direct real-IP access, missing
+mappings, or pool exhaustion fail closed. Resolver injection, DNS listeners,
+capture rules, and the transparent listener are all ready before workload
+execution. A runtime that cannot provide the complete contract rejects a policy
+containing explicit TCP endpoints rather than partially activating it. Because
+that substrate is startup infrastructure, a sandbox created without explicit
+TCP endpoints rejects a hot reload that introduces one and keeps its complete
+previous policy active; recreating the sandbox installs the substrate before
+the workload starts. A sandbox that started with the substrate may continue to
+remove and re-add TCP endpoints through ordinary atomic policy reloads.
+Workload DNS targets port 53, while nftables redirects eligible IPv4 DNS traffic
+to an unprivileged supervisor listener. The filter admits DNS and transparent
+TCP only when the kernel records the traffic as DNATed to the corresponding
+supervisor listener, so direct dials to either unprivileged listener port remain
+fenced. `SO_ORIGINAL_DST`, synthetic mapping lookup, endpoint correlation, and
+generation-pinned authorization form the transparent TCP security boundary.
+Docker and Podman do not currently advertise usable IPv6 egress for this
+substrate, so AAAA queries return NOERROR/NODATA and IPv6 DNS remains fenced.
 
 Provider credential placeholders are resolved through the live provider state
 for each HTTP request, after destination and L7 policy admission. A static

@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ pub const SUPERVISOR_TOPOLOGY: &str = "OPENSHELL_SUPERVISOR_TOPOLOGY";
 /// Network enforcement backend selected by the compute driver.
 pub const NETWORK_ENFORCEMENT_MODE: &str = "OPENSHELL_NETWORK_ENFORCEMENT_MODE";
 
+/// Comma-separated runtime networking capabilities supplied by the compute
+/// driver. Capabilities describe substrate the shared supervisor may activate;
+/// they never move policy evaluation into the driver.
+pub const NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES: &str = "OPENSHELL_NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES";
+
+/// Driver capability for policy-gated DNS and transparent TCP interception.
+pub const POLICY_DNS_TRANSPARENT_TCP_CAPABILITY: &str = "policy-dns-transparent-tcp";
+
 /// Whether network policy evaluation must bind requests to the peer binary.
 ///
 /// The default when unset is `"required"`. Kubernetes sidecar experiments may

@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ contract:
 | `restart_policy = unless-stopped` | Keeps managed sandboxes resumable across daemon or gateway restarts. |
 | `PidsLimit` | Enforces the sandbox PID budget at the Docker cgroup layer. Set `[openshell.drivers.docker].sandbox_pids_limit = 0` to inherit the Docker/runtime default. |
 | CDI GPU request | Uses opaque `driver_config.cdi_devices` values when set; otherwise selects the requested count of NVIDIA CDI GPUs in round-robin order when daemon CDI support is detected. Docker daemon `/info` can permit `nvidia.com/gpu=all` as a WSL2 all-only compatibility fallback, where it counts as one selectable device. Exact CDI device lists must not contain duplicates and must match the effective GPU count. |
+| `policy-dns-transparent-tcp` capability | Declares that the combined Docker supervisor can own namespace-local DNS/TCP capture and coupled workload restart. The shared supervisor still owns DNS eligibility, mappings, authorization, pinned dialing, relaying, and OCSF decisions. The marker is stripped from the workload environment. |
 
 The agent child process does not retain these supervisor privileges.
 

@@ -2456,6 +2456,10 @@ fn build_environment_for_oci_user(
         openshell_core::sandbox_env::TELEMETRY_ENABLED.to_string(),
         openshell_core::telemetry::enabled_env_value().to_string(),
     );
+    environment.insert(
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES.to_string(),
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::POLICY_DNS_TRANSPARENT_TCP_CAPABILITY.to_string(),
+    );
     // The root supervisor executes namespace helpers during bootstrap; keep
     // their search path driver-owned even when the template/spec set PATH.
     environment.insert("PATH".to_string(), SUPERVISOR_PATH.to_string());

@@ -619,6 +619,27 @@ fn build_environment_sets_docker_tls_paths() {
     assert!(env.contains(&"TEMPLATE_ENV=template".to_string()));
     assert!(env.contains(&"SPEC_ENV=spec".to_string()));
     assert!(env.contains(&"OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_COMMAND=sleep infinity".to_string()));
+    assert!(env.contains(&format!(
+        "{}={}",
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES,
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::POLICY_DNS_TRANSPARENT_TCP_CAPABILITY
+    )));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn build_environment_keeps_network_capabilities_driver_controlled() {
+    let mut sandbox = test_sandbox();
+    sandbox.spec.as_mut().unwrap().environment.insert(
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES.to_string(),
+        "spoofed".to_string(),
+    );
+    let env = build_environment(&sandbox, &runtime_config());
+    assert!(env.contains(&format!(
+        "{}={}",
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::NETWORK_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES,
+        openshell_core::sandbox_env::POLICY_DNS_TRANSPARENT_TCP_CAPABILITY
+    )));
+    assert!(!env.iter().any(|entry| entry.ends_with("=spoofed")));
 }
 
 #[test]